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COMMENT




"Mea culpa belongs to a man and his God. It is a plea that cannot
be exacted from free men by human authority."1
I. INTRODUCTION
The Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination is a
fundamental protection against government abuse of an indi-
vidual's autonomy, privacy, and dignity.2 Courts, however, have
unevenly applied the right to convicted sex offenders who, as a
condition of court-ordered therapy, must admit responsibility
for their crime.3 In some cases, if an offender does not admit
'Abe Fortas, The Fiflh Amendment: Nemo TeneturProdere Seipsum, 25 CLEv. B. ASS'NJ.
91, 100 (1954). "Mea culpa" is a Latin expression meaning "a formal acknowledg-
ment of personal fault." WEBSTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DIcTIoNARY 1397
(1966).
2 "No person shall... be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself..." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
' Most therapy programs for sex offenders require that the offender admit per-
sonal responsibility for his offense. See generally MARC S. CARICH, SEX OFFENDER
TREATMENT OVERVIEW: TRAINING FOR THE MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONAL, 89, 95, 107
(1997). Therapy for sex offenders also tends to vary considerably from traditional or
general therapy: therapy for sex offenders is more confrontational and more authori-
tarian; the goals of therapy are defined by societal mores, not the client; therapy is
aimed at increasing, not decreasing the offender's emotional pain; and offenders may
forgo confidentiality that is prevalent in general therapy. Id. However, some mental
health professionals have criticized this model of therapy for sex offenders, and have
suggested therapy programs that are less confrontational, and that do not focus di-
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responsibility for a crime, therapists terminate him from ther-
apy, and courts punish him with probation revocation and im-
prisonment.4 In other cases, courts have held that sentences
which penalize a convicted offender for refusing to admit to a
crime violate the offender's Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination!
Whether courts hold that the Fifth Amendment protects a
convicted offender from having to admit his guilt turns largely
on how the offender pled at trial. When a defendant pleads
guilty, he waives certain constitutional rights, including the right
against compulsory self-incrimination. Therefore, defendants
who have pled guilty have been penalized for denying their of-
fenses in therapy. If a defendant pleads not guilty, courts have
recognized his right, absent a grant of immunity, to continue to
maintain his innocence without being subjected to the con-
comitant penalties of probation revocation and imprisonment.
However, a grant of immunity does not preclude prosecution
for perjury,8 so even immunized offenders who pled not guilty
and testified on their own behalf at trial are still at risk of unwill-
ing self-incrimination if they are required to admit responsibility
in therapy. In addition, when a defendant enters either a nolo
contendere9 or Alford plea,'0 neither of which requires the defen-
rectly on the offender's admission of guilt. See infra notes 126-63 and accompanying
text.
" See, e.g., State v. Butler, 900 P.2d 908 (Mont. 1995); State v. Carrizales, 528
N.W.2d 29 (Wis. 1995); State v. Gleason, 576A.2d 1246 (Vt. 1990).
' See, e.g., Gilfillen v. State, 582 N.E.2d 821 (Ind. 1991); State v. Imlay, 813 P.2d 979
(Mont. 1991).
'Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969).
7See Imlay, 818 P.2d at 985; Gi/illen, 582 N.E.2d at 824.
' See Glickstein v. United States, 222 U.S. 139, 141 (1911); see also United States v.
Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 126 (1980).
'Aplea of nolo contendere gives the defendant the option of not contesting the issue
of guilt or innocence. A defendant does not have an automatic right to enter this
plea; the court must consent to it. The plea waives the defendant's right to trial and
waives all other claims not related to the plea itself. Following a nolo plea, the court
enters a conviction. However, a no01 plea may not be introduced into evidence in a
later civil or criminal action as proof that the defendant committed the offense un-
derlying the conviction. The defendant has a right to deny the facts of the crime in a
later proceeding. WAYNE 1L LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 932
(1992). See also United States v. Mapco Gas Products, 709 F. Supp. 895, 897 (E.D. Ark.
1989).
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dant to admit commission of the crime, courts hold that the
right against self-incrimination does not protect the offender
from having to admit responsibility for the crime in treatment."
An offender who enters a nolo or Alford plea forgoes the same
rights as an offender who pleads guilty, including the right
against self-incrimination. 2  These outcomes present problems.
Offenders who plead not guilty and testify in their own defense
at trial face an unsavory choice between confessing guilt in ther-
apy and risking that their admission will foreclose rights of ap-
peal and lead to further incrimination for perjury or other
crimes, or refusing to admit guilt and risking removal from
therapy and revocation of probation. Offenders who plead not
guilty and testify in their own defense, and then admit guilt in
therapy risk further incrimination for two reasons: (1) if com-
pletion of sex offender therapy is predicated on an admission of
guilt, and the offender completes therapy, his probation officer
will know that he admitted guilt and committed perjury at trial,
and (2) therapy for sex offenders is often characterized by more
limited confidentiality than in traditional client-therapist rela-
tionships, so an offender's admission of guilt may, and in some
cases must, be disclosed.'" Offenders who enter nolo or Alford
pleas may refuse to admit responsibility for an offense in court,
yet often must admit guilt in therapy. Though this presents no
constitutional problems, offenders who have refused to admit
guilt in court may not be inclined to admit guilt in therapy ei-
ther; thus their participation in therapy may be terminated,
'0 An Alford plea is entered formally as a guilty plea, but the offender refuses to
admit responsibility for the crime. A defendant may "voluntarily, knowingly, and un-
derstandingly consent to the imposition of a prison sentence even if he is unwilling or
unable to admit his participation in the acts constituting the crime." North Carolina
v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970). A defendant who refuses to admit guilt may never-
theless enter an Alford plea as a strategic decision to avoid the cost or publicity of a
trial, or to receive a less punitive sentence in exchange for the plea. See Alice J. Hin-
shaw, Comment, State v. Cameron: Making the Alford Plea an Effective Tool in Sex Of-
fense Cases, 55 MONT. L. REv. 281 (1994). A defendant who enters an Alford plea is
treated as waiving the same rights, including the right against self-incrimination, as a
defendant who enters a regular guilty plea. See State v. Butler, 900 P.2d 908, 911
(Mont. 1995).
" See Butler, 900 P.2d at 911; Gleason, 576 A.2d at 1250; Carrizales 528 N.W.2d at 32.
'2 See Butler 900 P.2d at 911; Glea=on, 576 A.2d at 1250.
13 See infra notes 114-16, 243 and accompanying text.
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leaving them untreated and more dangerous than if they had
been meaningfully involved in therapies that did not require an
admission of guilt.
14
To preserve Fifth Amendment rights in the case of con-
victed sex offenders sentenced to therapy subject to such condi-
dons, a state must offer offenders who pled not guilty and
testified in their own defense immunity from future prosecution
and protection against probation revocation. Furthermore, to
facilitate the rehabilitation of more convicted offenders, courts,
legislatures, and therapists ought to give greater consideration
to therapy programs that successfully treat sex offenders who
remain unwilling to admit responsibility for an offense. Such
therapy programs are also essential for resolving the dilemma
faced by offenders who have entered nolo or Alford pleas ex-
pressly to avoid a formal admission of guilt. Courts that require
these offenders to admit responsibility as a condition of contin-
ued participation in therapy and probation demand inconsis-
tent responses from the offenders regarding the offense
underlying the conviction. When courts allow offenders to en-
ter nolo or Alford pleas to avoid an admission in court, yet re-
quire them to accept responsibility in therapy, courts may set
these offenders up to fail to adhere to the requirements of ther-
apy. Offenders who avoided admitting guilt in court may be just
as inclined to avoid admitting guilt in therapy. Though not
constitutionally required, wider availability of therapy programs
offering treatment to such offenders who refuse to admit guilt
would allow more offenders who currently are removed from
treatment to receive treatment.
This Comment proposes that the state must offer immunity
from future prosecution, protection against probation revoca-
tion, and access to treatment that does not require an admission
of responsibility in order to preserve the Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination for convicted sex offenders in court-
mandated therapy. While offenders who enter nolo contendere or
Alford pleas waive their Fifth Amendment rights against self-
'4 See Mack E. Winn, The Strategic and Systematic Management of Denial in Cogni-
tive/Behavioral Treatment of Sexual Offenders, 8 SEXUAL ABUSE: J. RES. & TREATmENT 25,
26 (1996).
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incrimination, they would nonetheless benefit if courts sen-
tenced them to treatment programs that do not require admis-
sions of guilt prior to entrance, or as a condition of continued
participation in the program. More convicted offenders would
receive treatment if courts and therapists cooperated to increase
access to such therapy programs. This course of action would
serve the values of autonomy, privacy, and dignity that are pro-
tected by the Fifth Amendment, facilitate the rehabilitation of
convicted offenders using therapies previously ignored by the
courts, and further the state interest in protecting its citizenry.
Part II of this Comment explores the historical evolution of the
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. In the con-
text of an inquisitorial judicial heritage, the framers of the Fifth
Amendment intended to protect basic human dignity and
autonomy against the potentially coercive powers of govern-
ment.15 These values underscore the importance of tailoring
sentencing and therapy for sex offenders so that they are least
intrusive to the offender's rights. Part III explores traditional
and alternative theories of treating sex offenders. Most courts
accept without question the traditional notions that admission
of responsibility is a precursor to treatment and some coercive
pressure in treatment is effective at gaining such an admission.16
Other theorists posit that less confrontational treatment is more
effective at overcoming denial, and some studies show evidence
of effective treatment without focusing on responsibility for a
crime. Part IV outlines courts' current treatment of the di-
lemma that convicted sex offenders face between the possibility
"' See infra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
16 See Gollaher v. United States, 419 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1969). The court, upon im-
posing a stiffer sentence because of the defendant's refusal to admit guilt after his
conviction, noted that "it is almost axiomatic that the first step toward rehabilitation
of an offender is the offender's recognition that he was at fault." Id. at 530-31.
17 SeeJon J. Kear-Colwell, Guest Editorial: A Personal Position on the Treatment of Indi-
viduals Who Commit Sexual Offenses, 40 INT'L J. OFFENDER ThERAFY & CoMP.
CRIMNOLOGY 259, 261 (1996) (confrontation "makes little or no psychological sense
and could be considered antitherapeutic, even damaging"); Anita M. Schlank &
Theodore Shaw, Treating Sexual Offenders Who Deny Their Guilt: A Pilot Study, 8 SExuAL
AaUSE: J. REs. & TREATM mT 17, 21 (1996) ("safe environment and lack of pressure to
admit" to offense facilitate treatment and modification of denial); Winn, supra note
14, at 26 (studies have explored various treatment interventions which can be effec-
tive in the presence of denial).
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of future incrimination that accompanies an admission of re-
sponsibility and the termination of treatment and revocation of
probation that follows a denial. Last, Part V examines the cur-
rent case law and various modes of treating sex offenders in the
context of the interests protected by the Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination. This Part concludes that courts and
therapists neither sufficiently preserve convicted sex offenders'
Fifth Amendment rights, nor offer offenders adequate treat-
ment options. When offenders have testified in their own de-
fense at trial they should be afforded the right to deny that they
committed a sex offense in therapy without fearing probation
revocation or imprisonment. Modes of treatment previously
given little attention by the courts offer effective therapy without
focusing on an offender's admission of responsibility and allow
more offenders to receive treatment.
II. THE FIFTH AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF
INCRIMINATION
Most scholars agree that Justice Goldberg's statement in
Murphy v. Waterfront Commission"' on the purposes and policies of
the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination en-
dures as an accurate modem assessment of the privilege. 19 Jus-
tice Goldberg wrote:
[The privilege against self-incrimination] reflects many of our fun-
damental values and most noble aspirations: our unwillingness to subject
those suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury
or contempt; our preference for an accusatorial rather than an inquisito-
rial system of criminal justice; our fear that self-incriminating statements
will be elicited by inhumane treatment and abuses; our sense of fair play
which dictates "a fair state-individual balance by requiring the govern-
ment to leave the individual alone until good cause is shown for disturb-
ing him and by requiring the government in its contest with the
I8 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
" Lawrence Herman, The Unexplored Relationship Between the Privilege Against Compul-
soy Self-Incrimination and the Involuntay Confession Rule (Part HI), 53 OHIO ST. LJ. 497,
513 (1992) [hereinafter Herman, Part fl]. Herman observed that "the settled view of
scholarly literature" is that Goldberg's Murphy opinion "invests the constitutional
privilege with all of the values and interests that underlay the common law privilege:
the values of autonomy, dignity, privacy, and reliability, and the interests in bodily
and mental integrity." Id.
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individual to shoulder the entire load;" our respect for the inviolability of
the human personality and of the right of each individual "to a private
enclave where he may lead a private life; [and] our distrust of self-
deprecatory statements ....20
The privilege protects the dignity of the individual by ascrib-
ing sanctity to his freedom to keep private information about
himself.2' This essential conclusion grows out of a rich legal his-
tory that merits exploration. This Part examines the historical
development of the privilege against self-incrimination in Eng-
land and the United States, the elements necessary for its mod-
em invocation, and its historical and enduring purposes.
A. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRIVILEGE
The origins of the privilege against self-incrimination in
England pre-date the Magna Carta.22 In fact, some form of the
privilege against self-incrimination has been dated to the ius
commune-a combination of Roman and canon (ecclesiastic)
laws2s-and to Talmudic law before that.24 It is through the Eng-
lish history of the privilege, though, that its modem day values
and objectives of "autonomy, privacy, and dignity" began to take
shape.25
Murphy, 378 U.S. at 55 (citations omitted).
21 See Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973). Justice Powell wrote that the
privilege "is an intimate and personal one. It respects a private inner sanctum of in-
dividual feeling and thought and proscribes state intrusion to extract self-
condemnation." Id. at 327.
2 LEONARD W. LEvy, ORIGNs OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT: ITS ORIGINS AND
DEVELOPMENT ix (1968).
2 RICHARD H. HELMHOLZ ET AL., Tie PRIVILEGE AGA ST SELF-INCRIMINATION: ITS
ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 17 (1997). The privilege of the ius commune about which
Helmholz and his colleagues write was more narrow and less protective than our
modem day conception of the privilege. Further, the authors suggest that this history
and its understanding throughout the development of the privilege in England and
colonial North America argue for a more limited modem day conception of the Fifth
Amendment privilege. Id. at 46, 201-04. The privilege would require only a "showing
of solidly grounded suspicion before interrogation" of a suspect could begin. Id. at
204. Once a proper showing of probable cause had been made, a suspect or defen-
dant at trial could "reasonably be expected to respond," and silence could be consid-
ered to have a bearing on guilt. Id.
'41LEW, supra note 22, at 433.
Lawrence Herman, The Unexplored Relationship Between the Privilege Against Compul-
sory Self-Incrimination and the Involuntay Confession Rule (Part I), 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 101,
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Following the Norman Conquest of the late eleventh cen-
tury, England developed a system of ecclesiastical courts, sepa-
rate from secular courts, that held jurisdiction over all spiritual
matters and cases involving the clergy. 6 Gradually, as the eccle-
siastical court system expanded its jurisdiction over cases only
marginally ecclesiastical, it encroached upon the jurisdiction of
the secular courts.Y The ecclesiastical courts had a substantial
jurisdiction over criminal offenses against religion, and utilized
an inquisitorial procedure, "summoning people to answer reck-
less or unsupported charges."2 8 By the late twelfth century, secu-
lar courts more commonly followed accusatorial proceedings,
meaning that "there were a definite charge, a known accuser,
and open, rather than secret, proceedings."29 The Magna Carta,
signed in 1215, further attached importance to accusatorial
procedures in the secular courts. 0
182-83 (1992) [hereinafter Herman, Part 1]. The historical analysis in this Comment
follows the traditional view that the privilege against self-incrimination as embodied
in current American law has its origins in England. To be sure, as Helmholz et al. ar-
gue, the procedures of the English ecclesiastical courts mirrored the procedures and
notions of the Roman Church courts. See HELH OLZ Er AL., supra note 23, at 19;
Herman, Part I, supra, at 106. However, modem day notions of an accusatorial rather
than an inquisitorial system ofjustice grew out of the separate English lay courts. See
id The procedures of these secular courts were the basis for later protests against the
very limited conception of a privilege against self-incrimination held by the Roman
and English ecclesiastical courts. An expanded conception of the right against self-
incrimination and other protections for the accused that resulted from these protests
ultimately found their way into the United States Constitution. See LEVY, supra note
22, at 65-66, 416, 421-28.
26 LEW, supra note 22, at 43.
2 Id at 45.
9 Herman, Part I, supra note 25, at 106. Inquisitorial procedure allowed a trial
based on suspicion alone, with neither a specific accuser nor charges. A defendant
did not know the witnesses testifying against him, and there was little regard for evi-
dentiary standards. Proceedings were shrouded in secrecy, allowing for tyranny or
torture, and a defendant was presumed guilty. An accusatorial system, on the other
hand, required a definite accuser and knowledge by the defendant of the charges
against him. Witnesses were known to the defendant, and a "stringent" law of evi-
dence existed. Moreover, the defendant was presumed innocent until proven other-
wise before ajury trial open to the public. LEV, supra note 22, at 39.
"Herman, Part I, supra note 25, at 106. The Magna Carta provided for easy acqui-
sition of a writ which transferred a "case from a mode of private accusation.., to a
mode of public accusation (the precursor of the grandjury)." Id.
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In 1236, the oath de veritate dicenda became part of the Eng-
lish ecclesiastical courts' parlance. An inquisitional oath, it was
later and is presently known as the oath ex officio, "because the
judge compelled it by virtue of his office."3' The oath was a
sworn statement obligating a person to answer truthfully to all
questions in ecclesiastical actions without knowledge of his ac-
cuser, without having been formally charged, and without
knowledge of the evidence against him.2 The oath's require-
ment of truthful responses was designed to draw out a confes-
sion.s The ecclesiastical courts compelled confessions under
oath because the confessions provided evidence against the de-
fendant and rehabilitation for the defendant.34 Over the objec-
tions of Parliament, the ecclesiastical courts retained the oath ex
officos
John Lambert, in 1532, made the first recorded objection
that the oath was unlawful 6 Lambert did not claim a right to
remain silent; rather he claimed that he should not have to ac-
cuse himself by admitting to heresy without knowledge or notice
of the formal charges against him. 7 Lambert objected to the
use of the oath as a "fishing expedition," used in lieu of other
evidence.38 By the mid-sixteenth century, the "refusal on the
part of suspected heretics to accuse themselves became com-
3' LEw, supra note 22, at 46.
12 1& at 46-47.
"Id. at 47.
' William A. Nelson, The New Inquisition: State Compulsion of Therapeutic Confessions,
20 VT. L. REV. 951, 975 (1996). Nelson notes that the ecclesiastical courts claimed the
power not only to punish criminally, but spiritually-with eternal damnation. A con-
fession rehabilitated the defendant in that it spared him from damnation. The threat
of spiritual doom engendered as much fear and compulsion as torture. Id- at 977-78.
Nelson draws a loose analogy between the rehabilitative confessions of English eccle-
siastical courts and the compelled rehabilitative confessions required of convicted sex
offenders today. Id. at 970. He recognizes that though the "two systems share certain
significant attributes," they are not "subject to the same moral objections." Id at 974-
75. The notion of coercing confessions for rehabilitative purposes, recounts Nelson,
is not without a checkered history. Id at 975-80.
In the early fourteenth century, Parliament passed the Prohibitio Formata de
Statuto Articuli Cler, which objected to the use of the oath ex officio. The ecclesiastical
courts and the King's Council ignored it. Herman, Part I, supra note 25, at 110.




monplace."39 Refusal was grounded more and more in an objec-
tion to the oath's incriminating effect; silence, however, was also
seen as incriminating, and objectors were punished with impris-
onment.Y
John Udall, a Puritan minister suspected of writing seditious
material under a pseudonym, further advanced the notion that
courts were limited in their ability to compel responses from de-
fendants.4 1 Though Udall denied writing under the pseudonym,
he refused to answer further questions regarding whether he
had written other material considered heretical by the ecclesias-
tical courts.42 Even when apprised of the rehabilitative purposes
of confession-mercy and salvation by the Queen-Udall re-
fused. Thus, Udall likely became the first person to claim a le-
gal right of silence-a right against self-incrimination." The
judge advised the jury that Udall's silence was evidence of guilt,
and he was convicted."
In the early seventeenth century, Puritans looked increas-
ingly to the common law courts for relief from the perceived
unfairness of the oath ex officio.46 The common law courts,
though they offered more procedural safeguards, were not sym-
pathetic to a modem notion of a right against self-
incrimination;47 if possible, they would convict a person by his
3L w, supra note 22, at 79.
4 Herman, Part I, supra note 19, at 538-39.
41 LEW, supra note 22, at 164.
42 I
4Nelson, supra note 34, at 979-80.
44 LEw, supra note 22, at 168.
"Herman, Part i, supra note 25, at 120-21.
46 LZw, supra note 22, at 216. Puritans used the secular common law courts to
challenge the ecclesiastical courts' jurisdiction and procedures. Common law courts
had sparred with ecclesiastical courts since the twelfth century overjurisdiction-the
common law courts resented the ecclesiastical courts' encroachment, and envisioned
themselves as competent to try all matters. Common law courts could issue writs of
prohibition which enjoined the ecclesiastical courts from hearing a case. Puritans'
complaints regarding the oath ex officio provided an additional opportunity for the
common law courts to assert theirjurisdiction. Id. at 216-20.
17 Id. at 215-16. In the common law courts, the accused knew his accuser, the
charge, and the evidence against him. However, a defendant's silence could be used
as evidence of his guilt. Id
356 [Vol. 89
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own confession.48 In the common law courts, though, Puritans
did find a nationalistic resistance to courts that compelled the
taking of an oath, and to the Roman-based ecclesiastical law.4
The trials of John Lilburne in the 1640s increased the dis-
content of those who objected to the oath ex officio. Lilburne re-
fused to take an oath, and he refused to answer questions
regarding his own activities. Upon being held in contempt in
a trial for sedition, Lilburne asserted that compulsory self-
incrimination was against God's law and against the "self-
protective law of nature."51 Following the trials of John Lil-
burne, Parliament abolished the oath ex officio!' Common law
courts assumed jurisdiction over cases that threatened "life, lib-
erty, or property."53
Emboldened by Lilburne's example, others protested for a
right of silence separate from the compulsion of the oath ex offi-
cio.5' A petition before the House of Commons protested
against the right of any authority to compel a self-incriminating
statement.5 5 In the years following Lilburne's trials, the right
against self-incrimination was solidified. Defendants and wit-
nesses at trial were accorded a right against self-incrimination
fairly uniformly by the beginning of the eighteenth century.
6
Professor Herman concludes that the privilege was broadly ap-
plied under the English common law; it protected witnesses and
defendants and restricted not only courts, but "all of the agen-• ,,57
cies which then engaged in interrogation. Further, the privi-
lege began to offer witnesses and defendants the possibility of
4Id. at 215.
9 Id. at 216. The common law courts were unique to England, and they viewed the
ecclesiastical courts with some hostility. Id.
" Herman, Part I, supra note 25, at 136.
5 Id-
5s Id
1 Id at 137-38.
" LEw, supra note 22, at 295-96.
'6 Herman, Part I, supra note 25, at 147. Although a defendant's right to refuse to
answer a question seemed settled, defendants still represented themselves frequently,
and though not compelled by force to answer questions, they rarely if ever objected
to zealous questioning. Id. at 140-41.
57 Herman, Part 1, supra note 19, at 543.
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avoiding the perilous choice between punishment for silence
and punishment for coerced self-incrimination.
The English roots of the privilege and Lilbume's assertion
that the right against self-incrimination was fundamental to the
self-protective law of nature found fertile ground in the Ameri-
can colonies. Although in the seventeenth century, the asser-
tion of the right "was honored as often in the breach as in the
observance, ' 8 the eighteenth century conception of the right
changed, as is reflected in Benjamin Franklin's characterization
of it as one of the "common Rights of Mankind., 59 Drawing on
this belief, Virginia became the first state to include in its state
constitution the fundamental right of a person to not "be com-
pelled to give evidence against himself."60 The Framers of the
Fifth Amendment stated the right similarly: "No person... shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against him-
self."6' By placing the right against self-incrimination within the
Bill of Rights, the Framers warned against the "dangers of gov-
ernment oppression of the individual," and reiterated that the
sovereignty of government is subordinate to the rights of man.62
The Framers drew upon their English heritage, and sought to
prevent the coerced confessions and limited protections for de-
fendants that were found in the English ecclesiastical courts.6
Herman, Part i, supra note 22, at 163.
"LEw, supra note 22, at 383 (citing BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, SOME OBSERVATIONS ON
THE PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE REv. MR. HEMPInLL (1735), reprinted in PAPERS OF
BENJAMIn FRANKLN, Vol. 2, at 37, 44-45, 47, 49 (Leonard W. Labaree et al. eds.,
1959)).
' I& at 405. The language of the Fifth Amendment had its American roots in Sec-
tion 8 of the Virginia Declaration of Rights, which was drafted by George Mason. Id
at 405-06, 409.
61 U.S. CONST. amend. V. The text of the Fifth Amendment, as written by James
Madison, originally read, "no person... shall be compelled to be a witness against
himself." LEw, supra note 22, at 423. John Laurence, a Federalist lawyer from New
York, added the phrase "in any criminal case." See generally id. at 424-25.
62 LEW, supra note 22, at 430.
' See id. The American colonies adopted much of the English secular courts'
common law "most strikingly in the field of criminal procedure .... The conse-
quence was a greater familiarity with and respect for the right against self-
incrimination." Id. at 368. The adoption of an accusatorial rather an inquisitorial sys-
tem ofjustice reflected a choice on the part of the framers to protect individual rights
and preserve procedural safeguards for all, sometimes at the expense of punishing
the guilty. See Kathleen Patchel, The New Habeas, 42 HASTINGS LJ. 939, 1049 n.618
[Vol. 89
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B. DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODERN CONTOURS AND ELEMENTS OF
THE PRIVILEGE
The Fifth Amendment set forth the right against self-
incrimination ambiguously, leaving it open to interpretation
and expansion.6 The Supreme Court, largely during this cen-
tury, has interpreted the right broadly. The modem character-
istics of the right against self-incrimination take their shape
from two interrelated protections of the right. First, the right
prevents the use of compelled or coerced confessions.6 Second,
the right allows a person to remain silent in the face of ques-
tioning if he has a real fear of incriminating himself-the gov-
ernment may not obtain an incriminating statement by
compulsion.66
Compulsion is a necessary element for the right against self-
incrimination.67  The privilege "does not preclude a witness
from testifying voluntarily in matters which may incriminate
him."68 Consequently, if a person desires the protection of the
(1991) (citing Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 544-45 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
and Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 523-34 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
" LEw, supra note 22, at 430. The framers may have purposely drafted the right
against self-incrimination clause with ambiguity to engender debate about its "intent,
meaning, and purpose." Id The framers did not envision themselves as "framers of
detailed codes." Id
6Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963) (written confession of defendant in-
admissible as evidence because it was given involuntarily).
Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 598-600 (1896) (witness may only refuse to re-
spond to questioning if he truly fears incrimination, but not if he only fears shame or
indignity).
67 Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 304 (1966) (petitioner's incriminating
statements not protected by the right against self-incrimination in the absence of any
evidence of compulsion). Compulsion occurs when "a person has been ordered to
testify by a state actor who has the power to sanction the refusal to testify." RONAIDJ.
ALLEN ET AL., CONSTITUr[ONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1062 (3d ed. 1995). The right
protects only against compelled testimonial evidence, not physical evidence such as
handwriting or blood samples. Id at 479, 1154.
6United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 427 (1943) (holding that witnesses who
voluntarily gave self-incriminating testimony under oath are only protected from
prosecution because of statutory grant of immunity). Any consistent or reliable no-
tion of "voluntariness" is hard to find. The term is subject to wide-ranging interpreta-
tion and abuse. See gnerally Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986) (confession
given by mentally ill respondent who was following the orders of voices in his head
regarded as voluntary, and not, protected by the right against self-incrimination);
Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958) (confession of a man with a fifth-grade educa-
tion excluded after he had been subject to psychological intimidation); Brown v. Mis-
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privilege, he must affirmatively invoke it.0 If a person asserts
the privilege, then he has a right to refuse to answer a question,
and any demand that he answer will be indicative of compul-
sion.70 There are situations in which compulsion is assumed,
and the privilege is self-executing. For example, an affirmative
invocation of the privilege is required neither when an individ-
ual is interrogated in custody7' nor in a "classic penalty situa-
tion.'72 In a custodial situation, the pressures on a subject are
considered so strong that the state must advise him of his Fifth
Amendment right to remain silent and avoid incriminating
himself.73 In a penalty situation, a witness is faced with an im-
permissible choice between exercising his right against self-
incrimination and accepting a penalty for doing so, or waiving
his right and risking incrimination.74 Compulsion is assumed to
be present because a witness cannot affirmatively invoke the
privilege against self-incrimination (as is normally required) to
trigger compulsion without incurring a penalty. It is important
to distinguish between a penalty and ineligibility for a privilege.
If a criminal who has been granted probation is threatened with
probation revocation, that is a penalty-the probationer would
be deprived of a liberty he has.75 However, when an incarcer-
sissippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (suspects who confessed after being beaten did so invol-
untarily).
69 Monia, 317 U.S. at 427.
70 See Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973).
71 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (holding that the inherently compelling
pressures of in-custody interrogation demand that the accused be informed of his
right against self-incrimination).
7 Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420 (1984). The paradigmatic example of a
penalty situation in which compulsion is assumed is a witness who must choose be-
tween: (1) giving testimony that would incriminate himself, or (2) claiming a right
not to testify and being held in contempt. ALLEN ET AL., supra note 67, at 1062. See
also Thomas v. United States, 368 F.2d 941 (5th Cir. 1966) (defendant impermissibly
forced to choose between admitting guilt or denying guilt and suffering maximum
sentence); State v. Fuller, 915 P.2d 809, 815 (Mont. 1996) (issuance of a credible
threat of a penalty by lower court sufficient to create penalty situation for defendant,
even if court could not have carried out its threat).
7 3 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.7 Jessica Wilen Berg, Note, Give Me Liberty Or Give Me Silence: Taking a Stand on Fifth
Amendment Implications for Court-Ordered Therapy Programs, 79 CoRNELL L. Rxv. 700, 713
(1994).
' This is a penalty even if the probation was expressly contingent on fulfillment of
a condition.
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ated criminal is denied eligibility for probation for failure to sat-
isfy a necessary precondition, he has been denied a privilege-a
conditional liberty he desires, not assigned a penalty.
For a person to claim the right against incrimination, the
law requires that he must also show a real fear of incrimina-
tion.7 A "merely remote and naked possibility... such as no
reasonable man would be affected by, should not be suffered to
obstruct the administration of justice." Furthernore, fear of
infamy or disgrace is insufficient to claim the privilege.7 A per-
son is not exempted from the duty of disclosure only because
"testimony may tend to degrade [him] in public estimation ....
The design of the constitutional privilege is not to aid [a per-
son] in vindicating his character, but to protect him against be-
ing compelled to furnish evidence to convict him of a criminal
charge."' A person may cite a real fear of incrimination after
his own conviction because the fear extends to possible incrimi-
nation in the future as well as to current criminal proceedings.81
The government may counterbalance any real fear of in-
crimination by offering immunity from prosecution in exchange
for testimony. In this situation, the government may compel
testimony, under threat of contempt. Such a use of immunity
recognizes "the need of the State, as well as the Federal Gov-
ernment, to obtain information 'to assure the effective function-
ing of government.' '82  The individual giving incriminating
testimony is protected against the use of the testimony in a
prosecution against him, and further protected against the de-
rivative use of the testimony to unearth other evidence tending
76 Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1,
9 (1979).
'Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 599-600 (1896).
I at 600.
Fear of shame, alone, is an insufficient ground for claiming the right against self-
incrimination because, as Justice Brown explained, "[t]he safety and welfare of an en-
tire community" should not be undermined by an individual's desire to protect his
reputation. I. at 605.
Id. at 605-06.
", See Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 426 (1984); see also Lefkowitz v. Turley,
414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973).




to incriminate him. 3 Grants of immunity, however, do not pre-
vent a later prosecution for perjury. An exception for perjury is
allowed because of courts' inherent power to punish false testi-
84
mony.
The right against self-incrimination serves to restrict the
states as well as the federal government,5 and it may be invoked
in a state proceeding to protect against incrimination in a fed-
eral forum, and vice versa.86 Further, the right is available out-
side traditional courtroom and interrogation room settings-its
availability "does not turn upon the type of proceeding in which
its protection is invoked," but on the potential exposure to in-
crimination that a compelled statement may invite.
C. THE PURPOSES AND OBJECTIVES OF THE PRIVILEGE: THE
NATURE OF THE RIGHT PROTECTED
Underlying the evolution of the privilege's history in the
United States are certain basic objectives and values. The Fram-
ers of the Constitution believed that people were entitled to
some very basic rights, and wished to protect against the sort of
encroachment upon these rights that had occurred in England.
The privilege against self-incrimination manifested the Framers'
belief in the paramount importance of individual rights.
Though Levy finds little evidence in historical accounts of a spe-
cific theory or underlying policy of the right, 9 Professor Her-
man accounts for a right to silence and a prohibition of
Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972). The extent to which deriva-
tive use of immunized incriminating testimony is prohibited is beyond the scope of
this Comment. See generallyJEROLD ISRAEL & WAYNE LAFAVE, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN A
NtSHELL282-83 (1988).
", Glickstein v. United States, 222 U.S. 139, 141 (1911).
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964) (holding that the Fifth Amendment privi-
lege is incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment's restrictions against the states).
8Id. at 10-11.
17 Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 462 (1981) (quoting In re Gault 387 U.S. 1, 49
(1967) (right applicable to statements made during psychiatric examination)).
"See supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
89 See LEw, supra note 22, at 430-31. Levy does assert more generally that the Con-
stitution as a whole reflected the framers' view that "the citizen is the master of his
government, not its subject." Id. at 431.
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compulsion by pointing to three values that sustain the privilege
against self-incrimination: autonomy, privacy, and dignity.
The privilege protects the autonomy of an individual and
the privacy of one's own thoughts.9' Lambert's objection to the
oath ex officio as a "fishing expedition" (when he was questioned
about heresy charges) exemplifies this value. 92 Without knowl-
edge of the charges or evidence against him, Lambert did not
know to what he should confess under oath. Without a specific
charge, an obligation to answer generally to criminal allegations
invades the sanctity of an individual's mind and compromises
the extent to which the individual can control information
about himself.93 Lambert ran the risk of confessing to more
than the court suspected, or in the case of extreme coercion,
confessing falsely to put an end to his ordeal.
The objective of protecting the autonomy of the individual
is also reflected by a desire to allow suspects to remain silent, as
Udall did before the High Commission, without risking pun-
ishment. Under oath to testify truthfully, Udall faced either in-
criminating himself, or incrimination by implication through
"Herman, Part I, supra note 25, at 182-86. Herman notes that modem commenta-
tors assert that autonomy, privacy and dignity are the values that currently underlie
the protections of the right against self-incrimination and protect against the type of
abuses that were found in English history. Id. Commentators give these values inter-
related, if not overlapping definitions. Autonomy takes on meaning implying a free-
dom from government overreaching. For example, Louis Henkin suggests that
autonomy includes both a freedom from regulation and from official intrusion. See
Louis Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 CoLUM. L. REv. 1410, 1424-25 (1974). The
government intrusion exemplified by compelling a defendant to incriminate himself
violates both the defendant's autonomy and privacy because it compromises the indi-
vidual's ability to maintain control over information about himself. Herman, Part I,
supra note 25, at 183 n.436 (citing Charles Fried, Privauy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 488
(1968)). The individual's control over the information he releases about himself be-
comes weakened because the "browbeating" and threat of jail that accompany com-
pulsion create stress and fear that facilitate a willingness to make incriminating
statements. Id. at 182-84. See also MARK BERGER, TAMNG THE FYFTH 43 (1980) (stating
that the "core element" of privacy is control over personal integrity, including "the
ability to withhold information about ourselves."). Lastly, the value of dignity, as pro-
tected by the right against self-incrimination, reflects a freedom from a violation of
bodily integrity and the unreliable confessions that may result. Herman, Part I, supra
note 25, at 184.





his silence.9 The value of autonomy requires that the prosecu-
tion be required to provide its own proof, and that the knowl-
edge and conscience of the accused remain solely in his
dominion.
The purpose of protecting the individual's dignity grew out
of a distaste for courts-even the accusatory common law
courts-which exercised considerable pressure upon defen-
dants to incriminate themselves.95 The dignity of an individual
is compromised by coercion, whether verbal or physical. 6 A ban
on torture and a provision for the security of the criminally ac-
cused are among the most important functions of the right
against self-incrimination.9 '
Lilburne's insistence that a right against self-incrimination
was an inherent right, and America's constitutional Framers' be-
lief in rights of men that eclipse government sovereignty, point
to the evolution of a right that protects the sanctity of individual
thought and the "inviolability of the human personality.""" The
overlapping values of autonomy, privacy, and dignity manifest
themselves in the objectives of the right against self-
incrimination. In its contemporary conception, "the privilege is
an intimate and personal one."' Derived from an "abhorrence
of governmental assault against the single individual accused...
and the temptation [of the government] to resort to the expe-
dient of compelling incriminating evidence from" the mouth of
the accused, the privilege respects a private inner sanctum of
individual feeling and thought.1 °
94See Herman, Part , supra note 25, at 120-21.
"5 See Law, supra note 22, at 215-16.
96 Coercion engendered by torture or the mere threat of torture compromises the
individual's dignity by creating fear and stress sufficient to persuade the individual to
reveal information about himself that ordinarily he would not. The individual is
placed in the unsavory position of trading information for protection of his bodily in-
tegrity. Or, the individual's impulse for self-preservation may lead him to provide in-
formation that is not true just to avoid further torture. Herman, Part I, supra note 25,
at 182-84.
7 LEVY, supra note 22, at 430.
" Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964). See also Law, supra note
22, at 430; Herman, Part I, supra note 25, at 136.




III. TREATMENT OF SEXUAL OF NDERS
As prison beds become increasingly scarce, and the cost of
incarceration rises, courts continue to develop alternatives to
imprisonment.' 1 In cases involving convicted sex offenders,
courts increasingly suspend imprisonment, and sentence of-
fenders to probation conditioned upon successful participation
in specialized treatment programs. 2 Specialized treatment can
be an effective means of reducing sex offenders' tendency to
reoffend. °5 These treatment programs almost universally re-
quire the offender to admit responsibility for the offense under-
lying the conviction as a condition of entry and continued
participation in the program.' M This is a difficult hurdle for sex
offenders, who are particularly likely to deny their offenses 0 5
However, amenability to treatment and successful rehabilitation
are widely regarded to hinge upon eliminating denial and re-
placing it with an admission of responsibility for past sexual de-
'0' See Michael Tonry & Mary Lynch, Intermediate Sanctions, 20 CRIME &JusT. 99, 100
(1996) (reporting that in 1993, federal prisons were operating at 136% capacity, 39
state systems were operating above rated capacity, and that in 1994 corrections budg-
ets were the fastest rising component of state spending). See also Leonore H. Tavill,
Scarlet Letter Punishment: Yesterday's Outlawed Penalty is Today's Probation Condition, 36
CLEV. ST. L. REv. 613 (1988). Tavill observes that the "judicial system has turned to
alternative sentencing as a solution" to prison overcrowding and costs. Id. at 614.
"[T]he most common alternative form of sentencing has become probation accom-
panied by certain restrictive conditions." Id.
102 Scott Michael Solkoff, Note, Judicial Use Immunity and the Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination in Court Mandated Therapy Programs, 17 NovA L. REv. 1441, 1449-50
(1993) (citing Barbara E. Smith et al., The Probation Response to Child Sexual Abuse Of-
fenders: How is it Working?, AB.A. CRIM.JUSr. SEC. 1-14 (1990)).
1'3 RobertJ. McGrath, Sex Offender Risk Assessment and Disposition Planning. A Review
of Empirical and Clinical Findings, 35 INT'LJ. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRBuNOLOGY
328, 329 (1991); William L. Marshall & Howard Barbaree, The Long-Term Evaluation of
a Behavioral Treatment Program for Child Molesters, 26 BEHAv. RE s. & THERAPY 499, 505
(1988). Recidivism among sex offenders tends to be high; untreated offenders re-
offend up to 60% of the time. See McGrath, supra. Specialized treatment can reduce
this recidivism rate significantly. See id.; WuIIAM L. MARSHALL ET AL., HANDBOOK OF
SEXUAL ASSAULT 285 (1990) (citing study of 100 clients in which only eight re-
offended). One study reports that if only one offender in fifty is treated successfully
the cost of treatment is still cost beneficial. Id. at 7. In this discussion, "offender" and
"client" will be used interchangeably.
'02Schlank & Shaw, supra note 17, at 18; Winn, supra note 14, at 26-27.
"0' See Schlank & Shaw, supra note 17, at 18. See also Carich, supra note 3, at 20.
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viancy.' ° If an offender refuses to admit responsibility for the
offense, he is typically terminated from his treatment program,
and subject to probation revocation and imprisonment. 10 7 The
reality that offenders are sentenced to treatment programs in-
voluntarily, the tendency of sex offenders to be especially prone
to denial,0' and offenders' fears regarding the incriminating
consequences of disclosing their offenses all challenge an of-
fender's capacity to participate successfully in treatment pro-
grams.
Denial is a significant component "of an offender's re-
sponse to disclosure" of his sexual offense."' 9 Disclosure often
occurs when an offender is convicted and sentenced to treat-
ment for an offense. Therapists describe a dilemma between
preferring clients who are mandated by a court's sentence to at-
tend treatment, 0 and clients who will willingly admit responsi-
bility for a sexual offense."' Clients who attend therapy on a
voluntary basis, without a court order, tend to evade real treat-
ment by convincing themselves that they are quickly "cured"
and that they no longer need to follow procedures of the treat-
ment program." This option is not available to an offender
who is in therapy as an involuntary condition of his probation
because the therapist wields the threat of imprisonment as a
consequence of non-compliance with established procedures of
the treatment program. Thus, from the perspective of the
therapist, resources are best spent on clients who are mandated
to be there and more likely to complete treatment.1' Yet invol-
untary placement in a treatment program, though it prevents
resort to claims of a "quick-fix," may not be particularly condu-
cive to an offender's admission of responsibility for his behavior.
, Winn, supra note 14, at 26-27.
See State v. Gleason, 576 A.2d 1246, 1249 (Vt. 1990).
"' Solkoff, supra note 102, at 1451 (citing BARRY M. MALET=Z, TREATING THE
SEXUAL OFFENDER 12-34 (1991)).
10 ANNA C. SALTER, TREATING CHILD SEX OFFENDERS AND VICTIiS: A PRAcrcAL
GUIDE 96 (1988).
"o Id- at 86.
. I& at 67.
1 Id at 86.
.Id at 86-87.
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Further complicating the therapist-client relationship is the
fact that treatment of sex offenders is also frequently character-
ized by more limited confidentiality than a traditional therapist-
client relationship. Limited confidentiality is imposed by stat-
ute in all states with respect to abuse of children: therapists are
required to report an admission of such abuse, whether or not it
is related to the offense for which the offender is in therapy.115
In practice, not all therapists report abuse even though they le-
galy have no discretion. 16 However, therapists are bound by an
ethical duty to the client to acknowledge that their communica-
tions may not be entirely privileged. 17 Therapists' hesitance to
report or to tell clients that all such statements are subject to
disclosure is due, in part, to the recognition that limits on con-
fidentiality may limit or alter client disclosures."'
The conventional view of treatment professionals is that de-
nial must be overcome for therapeutic work to proceed effec-
tively.119 Therapists identify several types or components of
denial that occur along a spectrum: denial of acts or facts, de-
nial of responsibility, denial of awareness, denial of fantasy and
planning, denial of inappropriate feelings, and denial of the se-
rious impact of behavior.'2 When an offender frequently ex-
presses denial of facts-a refusal to admit that the sexual offense
ever happened-therapists will often deem an offender untreat-
able and unsuitable for their therapy program. Intolerance
for denial of facts may stem from a conception of the different
types of denial as static, having little movement within or among
" Ia at 89.
"' Murray Levine & Eric Doherty, The Fifth Amendment and Therapeutic Requirements
to Admit Abus 18 CGim.J. & BEHAV. 98, 100 (1991).
116 Id
"
7 Id, at 109.
118 I
"9 Edith Fein & Gerrie V. Bishop, Child Sexual Abuse: Treatment for the Offender, Soc.
CAsEwoRmJ. CONTEw. Soc. WoRK, Feb. 1987, at 122, 123.
' These components represent the overlapping conceptions of denial asserted by
more than one author. See SALTER, supra note 109, at 97; Nathan L. Pollock &Judith
M. Hashmall, The Excuses of Child Molesters, 9 BEHAv. Sa & L. 53, 57 (1991); Winn, su-
pra note 14, at 27-28.
- Winn, supra note 14, at 27. See State v. Imlay, 813 P.2d 979, 981-82 (Mont.
1991).
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the types.12 If a therapist sees little sign of progress in a client
that denies facts, and does not expect that the nature of the cli-
ent's denial will change, he is apt to dismiss the client from the
program.
Given the tendency of offenders to initially deny or mini-
mize the impact of their offense and the fact that they are fre-
quently in treatment against their will, some therapists advocate
a confrontational approach to therapy.123 Confrontation need
not be equated with hostility, but under this approach, the
therapist takes explicit value stances, indicates that he does not
trust the offender, and consistently redirects dialogue so that
the offender comes to terms with his behavior.1 24 Many thera-
pists view group therapy as useful because other offenders are
usually adept at confronting a new group member's denial or
resistance to treatmentIH
Other therapists suggest that a confrontational approach
may not be the most effective approach. Support exists in the
treatment community for therapy programs that attempt to
produce change in offenders' behavior with a motivational ap-
proach rather than a confrontational approach.26 While the
confrontational approach may confirm "in the offender[] the
feeling that [he has] no control over [his] behavior and that
controls have to be imposed," the motivational approach at-
tempts to engender a desire within the offender to change-to
do something for himself.27 ProfessorJon Kear-Colwell suggests
that the confrontational approach makes little psychological
sense and may be damaging to a sexual offender because it rein-
forces the offender's view that his locus of control is outside
himself.128 It strips the offender of a sense of autonomy and self-
122 Bruce Laflen & William R. Sturm, Jr., Understanding and Working With Denial in
Sexual Offenders, 3J. CHMID SEXUAL ABUSE 19, 21 (1994).
'2 SALTER, supra note 109, at 93.
124 Id. at 88-95.
'2 Fein & Bishop, supra note 119, at 123.
'2 Kear-Colwell, supra note 17, at 261. See also Winn, supra note 14, at 30 (noting
that especially those who are vulnerable and dependent on their defenses may not re-
spond well to confrontation).
'2 Kear-Colwell, supra note 17, at 261.
i a
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control. On the other hand, the motivational approach keeps
the locus of control within the offender and allows him to feel
like he has the power to make decisions and be responsible for
his own behavior.1' The motivational approach is grounded in
negotiation, rather than imposition and control by the thera-
pist.' Kear-Colwell laments that the motivational approach is
seen as soft on offenders and "almost as colluding with them,"
but he asserts that the therapist's first responsibility is to his cli-
ent, not to a community at large that perceives such treatment
as coddling criminals.""
Sentencing courts tend to accept the aforementioned con-
ventional views about the treatment of sexual offenders.3 The
need for an offender to admit responsibility for his sexual of-
fense, the role of confrontation and the threat of imprisonment
in ensuring compliance with the terms of a treatment program
are accepted as given. Courts tend to ignore other modes of
treatment that require neither a threshold willingness to admit
responsibility for a sexual offense, nor a confrontational ap-
proach to offender denial. These other treatment philosophies
provide alternatives for dealing with the inherent tension be-
tween rehabilitation and offenders' fears of shame and future
incrimination. They recognize that neither denial nor amena-
bility to treatment are static variables, and that therapeutic envi-
129Id.
. Id. at 259. Kear-Colwell acknowledges the tension between "the rights of the of-
fender" and "the greater good of society." Id. This tension, he concludes, is part of
his profession, and he owes a duty first to the offenders he treats. Id
2 See, e.g., Gollaher v. United States, 419 F.2d 520, 530 (9th Cir. 1969) (affirming
trial court's decision to impose a harsher sentence because of defendant's refusal to
admit guilt after he was convicted). The Ninth Circuit maintains that it is "almost
axiomatic that the first step toward rehabilitation is the offender's recognition that he
was at fault." Id.
' As of the publication date I found only one case acknowledging a sex offender
treatment program that did not require admission of sex crimes. See In re E.H. m,
578 N.W.2d 243,250 (Iowa 1998). I found no other mention in court opinions of the
sort of alternative treatments described below, infra notes 135-63 and accompanying
text. These treatments put less emphasis on immediate acceptance of responsibility,
and suggest that confrontation may be counterproductive to rehabilitation.
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ronments less focused on confrontation may be more conducive
to facilitating rehabilitation. T'
One mode of therapy, known as metaconfrontation, recog-
nizes the protective function that denial serves for offenders,
and aims to induce eventual acceptance of responsibility by ex-
pressing empathy for the offender's initial need to deny.'m
Metaconfrontation, proposed by therapist Mack E. Winn, is di-
rected toward offenders who do not respond well to direct con-
frontation and who might otherwise have been deemed
untreatable because of the perceived intransigence of their de-
nial.3 6 A therapist poses a series of hypothetical questions de-
signed to get the client to think about the negative emotional
and social consequences of admitting responsibility for sexual
deviancy.17 By continuing to focus on such hypotheticals over a
series of sessions the therapist produces a "climate of empathic
intensity," in which the client may begin to feel comfortable as-
cribing the characteristics and consequences of denial to him-
self.1' Once the emotional and functional bases for denial are
exposed, the therapist then works to challenge the offender to
accept responsibility for his sexual deviance. 39 The therapist
works to achieve this goal without a direct and unsolicited con-
frontation which could engender counterproductive defensive-
ness in the offender.4 0  This approach recognizes that
confrontation may not be effective with clients who are "most
vulnerable and dependent on their defenses."4  Instead of a di-
rect confrontation, the therapist asks for explicit permission to
challenge the offender's denial, and in doing so, gains the of-
fender's compliance to examine himself.4 2 Further, the thera-
pist, by creating an empathetic environment, aligns himself with
the offender's strengths and encourages the offender to use his
' See Schlank & Shaw, supra note 17, at 21; Winn, supra note 14, at 30.
Wren, supra note 14, at 30.
"3 Id. at 26, 30.
'"7 Id. at 29.
138 atd
"I9 1 at 31.
,40 Id. at 31-32.




strengths to confront his own weaknesses, those parts of him
that want to protect and deny.1 43 These procedures are aimed at
preserving the client's autonomy, encouraging responsibility,
and avoiding a reversion to defensive posturing.
44
Another treatment study, done by Anita Schlank and Theo-
dore Shaw, emphasizes the importance of trying to treat those
offenders in absolute denial who are frequently dismissed from
therapy programs as untreatable. 45 Left untreated, such of-
fenders are more prone to commit more crimes once released
into the community than those who have admitted responsibil-
ity for their sexual offense. In the Schlank and Shaw treat-
ment program, offenders who profess absolute denial of their
offense participate in exercises designed to explain the protec-
tive function of denial and elicit empathy for victims. 4 7 Thera-
pists then introduce clients to concepts of relapse prevention
and ask them to apply these concepts to a behavior they are will-
ing to change, such as smoking marijuana. 4  The clients then
are asked to imagine applying "the model to someone who
might be guilty of the offense for which [they have] been ac-
cused.', 4 9 Modification of denial is facilitated by a "safe envi-
ronment and lack of pressure to admit [the] offense.', 5 ' This
treatment procedure is conceived as an intermediary step for of-
fenders who are removed from traditional treatment programs
"1I& at 32-33.
" Id at 31, 33. Winn notes that an offender in denial who is "meaningfully in-
vested in cognitive or behavioral therapies," which teach him to recognize and dimin-
ish deviant sexual arousal, "may be less of a risk than [an offender] who admits his
offense but never completes treatment or one who is rejected from treatment due to
his unwillingness to own his offense." I& at 26. Winn acknowledges that those of-
fenders who do accept responsibility for their offense are less likely to re-offend than
those who do not. Id. However, he contends that too many offenders are denied
treatment and deemed untreatable because they initially refuse to admit responsibil-
ity for their offense. Id. at 27. Thus, Winn advocates his treatment program as a way
of treating more offenders, especially those who continue to deny their offense. Id.
" Schlank & Shaw, supra note 17, at 18.
146 a
"7 Id. at 20.
148 
1.




for absolute refusal to admit responsibility for their behavior.'5,
Following this therapy, offenders are better prepared to con-
tinue with further treatment which may or may not focus on
ownership of the offense underlying the client's crime.
Schlank and Shaw administered their therapy program to ten
offenders who had been denied acceptance to other treatment
programs because they refused to accept responsibility for their
offense.' Of the ten, five responded to motivational treatment
and admitted their offenses.5
Some studies have investigated the possibility of treating a
sexual offender "without a direct focus on the offender's owner-
ship of the offense of which he was convicted."55 These studies
suggest that cognitive and behavioral therapies can effectively
reduce the risk offenders pose to a community, though the of-
fender is not directly held accountable for his offense as part of
therapy.56 One study by Borduin et al. focuses on improving
the offender's functioning within the multiple systems (e.g.,
family, peer, school) that contributed to his criminal behavior.' 57
The therapist facilitates goal-setting and intervention in systems
that may best support a change in the offender's anti-social be-
havior.5  People who comprise the various systems are involved
in the client's therapy by working to alter the system to provide
support to the client. For example, family therapy may promote
communication about issues of sexuality.5 9 Though this sort of
treatment attempts to reduce denial and other problematic of-
fender characteristics, there is no explicit emphasis on accept-
ing responsibility for an offense. Clients of multisystemic
treatments demonstrated lower recidivism rates than those in




... Winn, supra note 14, at 26.
"' See Charles M. Borduin et al., Multisystemic Treatment of Adolescent Sexual Offenders,
34 INT'LJ. OFFENDER THERAFY & COMp. CRMNOLOGY 105, 111 (1990); Marshall &
Barbaree, supra note 103.
7 Borduin, supra note 156, at 106.
MId. at 1ll.
" Id at 110.
[Vol. 89
1998] REHABILITATION WITHOUT INCRIMNA TION 373
individual therapy.'60 Over a period of twenty-one to forty-nine
months, clients of multisystemic treatments exhibited a recidi-
vism rate of 12.5% for sexual offenses.161 This is a significant
improvement over a 60% recidivism rate for untreated offend-
ers. 1 62 Other behavior and cognitive therapies take differing ap-
proaches to changing the offender's behavior. Another study
that did not focus on offenders' ownership of their offenses util-
ized behavioral treatments designed to condition offenders to
associate criminal sexual impulses with negative sensations.16
IV. THE FITH AMENDMENT RIGHTS OF CONVICTED SEXUAL
OFNDERS: RECENT CASE LAW
The Fifth Amendment 64 right against self-incrimination is a
fundamental protection against government abuse of individual
autonomy, privacy and dignity. Courts, however, have unevenly
applied the right to convicted sex offenders who, as a condition
of their court-ordered therapy, must admit responsibility for
their crime. Offenders frequently must choose between admit-
ting responsibility and risking that their admission will foreclose
rights of appeal and lead to further incrimination, or refusing to
admit guilt and risking removal from therapy and revocation of
probation. Whether this choice violates the principles of the
right against self-incrimination remains disputed, and often
turns on what plea the offender enters at trial. Though it is set-
tled that "a defendant waives certain constitutional rights [by
pleading guilty,] including.., his privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination," 16 the law is less clear for defendants who
have been convicted, but did not plead guilty. Courts have pre-
16 Id- at 110-11.
1.1 Id. at 110.
162 See McGrath, supra note 103, at 329. McGrath cited a U.S. Department ofJustice
study that suggested that the recidivism rate for untreated sexual offenders is about
60% within a three year period following their release from incarceration. Id
163 Marshall & Barbaree, supra note 103, at 499-500. This study, though it did not
focus on ownership of offenses, did not include any subjects who denied their of-
fenses.
'"See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
'"Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969) (quoting McCarthy v. United States,
394 U.S. 459 (1969)).
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served the right better, though not fully, for offenders who
plead not guilty at trial, but have said that it does not apply to
offenders who enter nolo contendere or Alford pleas.'6 An exami-
nation of the relevant recent case law proves instructive in an ef-
fort to reconcile the courts' positions.
A. NOT GUILTY PLEAS
In State v. Imlay,167 Donald Imlay was convicted of sexual as-
sault following a jury trial at which he pled not guilty and testi-
fied on his own behalf.16 The trial court sentenced him to five
years in prison, but suspended the sentence, choosing to place
Imlay on probation under the condition that he enroll in and
complete a sexual therapy program.169 Though Imlay attended
all appointments with his sexual therapy counselor over the
course of six months, he was advised that he could not continue
with the treatment program because he would not admit re-
sponsibility for the crime for which he was convicted.1 70 His
therapist testified that Imlay was not amenable to treatment be-
cause he would not admit that he had committed a sex of-
fense.17' The court found Imlay in violation of his probation for
failing to complete a therapy program; his probation was re-
172
voked and he was ordered to serve five years of prison time.
Imlay appealed the decision to revoke his probation173 The
Montana Supreme Court vacated this decision, holding that Im-
lay's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination had been
" Compare State v. Imlay, 813 P.2d 979 (Mont. 1991), and State v. Fuller, 915 P.2d
809 (Mont. 1996) (both holding that a convicted sex offender who pled not guilty at
trial could not be forced to admit responsibility for his offense in therapy under pen-
alty of probation revocation and imprisonment), with State v. Gleason, 576 A.2d 1246,
1269 (Vt. 1990) (holding that a convicted sex offender who entered a nolo contendere
plea waived his right against self-incrimination following his conviction), and State v.
Butler, 900 P.2d 908 (Mont. 1995) (holding that a convicted sex offender who entered
an Alford plea waived his right against self-incrimination).
167 813 P.2d 979 (Mont. 1991).
' Id. at 980.
,s' Id at 981.
170 md
'7' Id at 982.
172 id
'7-' Id at 980.
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violated.' 74 The court observed that Imlay was faced with a "ter-
rible" choice: he could admit to the crime in accordance with
the requirements of the therapy program and incriminate him-
self for perjury, or he could maintain his innocence and be pe-
nalized with imprisonment.175 The court noted further that
Imlay retained his Fifth Amendment rights even after his con-
viction. Even after conviction by a trial court, a defendant is not
irrevocably adjudged guilty because he still has available to him
the "right to challenge his conviction, based on newly discov-
ered evidence."176 So not only would an admission of guilt in-
criminate Imlay for perjury, it would all but foreclose his
opportunity to exercise his rights of appeal.7  Imlay faced a
classic penalty situation in which the Fifth Amendment is self-
executing--he had to choose between incriminating himself or
accepting a penalty for refusing to do so; under the Fifth
Amendment's application, Imlay was faced with coercion and a
real fear of incrimination, so he could not be punished for as-
serting his own innocence.7
The Montana Supreme Court vacated the order which had
revoked the suspended sentence on the grounds that it was a
violation of Imlay's right against self-incrimination, absent a
grant of immunity, to penalize him for refusing to confess to a
'7 Id at 985.
17 Id. at 983.
176 Id at 985. See also Thomas v. United States, 368 F.2d 941, 945 (5th Cir. 1966)
(holding that a convicted offender's sentence may not be augmented if he refuses to
confess to his crime because this would foreclose his rights to exercise the "processes
of motion for new trial (including the opportunity to discover new evidence), appeal
... and collateral attack").
"' Imlay, 813 P.2d at 985. The court stated that Imlay's right to challenge his con-
viction based on new evidence "would be rendered meaningless if [he] could be
compelled to admit guilt as a condition to his continued freedom... [and] the reli-
ability of an admission of guilt under such circumstances would be highly suspect."
Id. At a new trial, the prosecution would have to introduce evidence anew, if Imlay
had admitted guilt to his therapist, his probation officer presumably would know ei-
ther because of limited therapist-client confidentiality, or by implication of Imlay's
completion of the treatment. This evidence of an admission would not only foreclose
appeal, but the State could introduce it to prosecute for perjury.
'" See generally Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 304 (1966) (compulsion re-
quired to activate the right against self-incrimination); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591,
599-600 (1896) (may refuse to testify only if truly fear incrimination).
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crime in therapy.'7 The Montana Supreme Court then re-
manded the case to the trial court, which resentenced Imlay to
five years in prison.80 The Montana Supreme Court upheld the
lower court's second sentence, and the United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari to review the case,"" but then dismissed
the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. 2 The Court
concluded that there existed no real case or controversy be-
cause no matter how they decided the case, Imlay's imprison-
ment would be the same.8 3 If the State won, sentencing courts
would retain the right to punish the probationer with five years
imprisonment if he refused to admit guilt in therapy, while if
Imlay won, the sentence on remand of five years in prison would
apply."
While the Montana Supreme Court decision in Imlay stands
for the proposition that a convicted sex offender who is sen-
tenced to therapy may remain silent, absent a grant of immu-
nity, when asked to confess to his crime as part of treatment1ss
171 Imlay, 813 P.2d at 985.
,80 See Montana v. Imlay, 506 U.S. 5, 6 (1992). By resentencing Imlay to a prison
term instead of probation conditioned upon successful completion of a sex offender
therapy program, the lower court did not put Imlay in a position in which his free-
dom from prison was dependent upon an admission of guilt.
,I, Montana v. Imlay, 503 U.S. 905 (1992).
' Montana v. Imlay, 506 U.S. 5 (1992).
183 1& at 6.
184 Imlay would not be entitled to probation with treatment if he won because the
case initially accepted for review by the Supreme Court was the Montana Supreme
Court's decision to uphold the lower court's second sentence of five years in prison.
The Supreme Court ultimately dismissed the writ of certiorari precisely because Im-
lay's sentence would be the same no matter which side prevailed; the Court refused to
issue an advisory opinion in a matter that it believed did not qualify as a case or con-
troversy. See id. at 6 (Stevens, J., concurring).
18 It may not seem like Imlay protects convicted offenders' rights against self in-
crimination because Donald Imlay ultimately ended up serving a five year prison term
as a consequence of his refusal to admit guilt. However, when the lower court sen-
tenced him again, it was essentially considering the case de novo in light of the Mon-
tana Supreme Court's holding; it was not reacting to Imlay's refusal to admit guilt in
therapy. In future cases, trial courts will face a choice between sending the convicted
offender to prison, as the lower court ultimately did in Imlay, or sentencing the of-
fender to probation and sex offender therapy with a grant of immunity. Though the
Montana courts' resolution of this issue better preserves offenders' rights, I argue that
admissions made in therapy still raise Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination problems because the state may not immunize against a prosecution
for perjury. Such a prosecution is still a risk because completion of a therapy pro-
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State v. FulleW8 requires that when confessions are extracted in
such a situation, they may not be used to convict the offender
for another sex offense. After a trial at which he pled not guilty,
Matthew Fuller was convicted of attempted sexual assault. How-
ever, the trial court suspended his prison sentence, requiring
instead that he complete a sex offender treatment program.
18 7
The program required patients to disclose their offense history
for admission to the program, and it terminated from treatment
those patients who denied their offense during the program."'8
The trial court had advised Fuller that, for him, termination
from the program would result in imprisonment.' 9 While in
treatment, Fuller admitted to three prior sex offenses.19 In ac-
cordance with its statutory duty, the treatment program in-
formed the Montana Probation and Parole Department which
in turn informed the local Police Department of Fuller's prior
offenses.19' Fuller's suspended sentence was revoked for unre-
lated violations of probation, he was imprisoned, and later he
was charged with the three additional sex offenses that he had
disclosed in treatment.'9 Fuller moved to dismiss the charges,
alleging that the State had violated his right against compelled
self-incrimination.19 The trial court denied the motion, and ul-
timately convicted Fuller of the charges. Fuller then appealed
the denial of his motion.194
The Montana Supreme Court, upon reviewing the latter
conviction, reversed the trial court's denial of Fuller's motion.195
The court concluded that Fuller's Fifth Amendment right
against compelled self-incrimination was violated because he
gram would imply an admission of the sex offense and that the offender who testified
in his own defense at trial committed perjury. See infra notes 241-43 and accompany-
ing text.
"' 915 P.2d 809 (Mont. 1996).
'8id. at 811.
I9& at 814.




'9' I& at 810.
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was placed in the equivalent of a classic penalty situation, forced
to choose between incrimination and a penalty for maintaining
his silence.'9 The court observed that the sentence of the trial
court in the original case likely was invalid under Imlay, and that
it likely could not have revoked Fuller's probation had he re-
fused to disclose his prior offense history.197 However, the court
wrote that the issuance of a credible threat to revoke Fuller's
probation if he did not admit his guilt was sufficient to place
Fuller in an untenable position. 9s Fuller was required to reveal
his past offense history or risk his conditional liberty, which
made the right against self-incrimination self-executing.'9 Be-
cause the right is self-executing in such a circumstance, the Fifth
Amendment protected the confessions that Fuller made, and
they could not be used against him in later sex offense prosecu-
tions.S00
One additional detail of Fuller merits mentioning. After
Fuller's acceptance into the treatment program, but before his
second trial, Fuller's original conviction was reversed by the
Montana Supreme Court for lack of evidence, and the court ac-
quitted Fuller of the original charges.Y It can be inferred from
the court's opinions that Fuller never admitted to the first of-
fense in treatment.2Y2 Had the treatment program forced him to
do so, an admission of the first offense may not have been ad-
missible into evidence on appeal. However, had the court not
granted an acquittal on appeal, but granted a new trial, an ad-
mission of guilt made in therapy surely would have undermined
Fuller's case in a new trial.
1 Id at 816.






20' Id at 811 (citing State v. Fuller, 880 P.2d 1340 (1994)).
See id. (noting that Fuller disclosed several past offenses, including the three ul-
timately prosecuted; there is no mention of an admission to the crime for which
Fuller was initially convicted and sentenced to treatment).
20' See State v. Imlay, 813 P.2d 979, 985 (Mont. 1991) (observing that an offender's
right to challenge his conviction based on new evidence in a new trial would be "ren-
dered meaningless" if he had admitted responsibility for the offense during therapy).
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B. THE NOLO CONTENDEREAND ALFORD PLEA CASES
There is precedent standing in tension with the principles
articulated in Imlay and Fuller. These cases involve defendants
who either entered a plea of nolo contendere, or entered an Alford
Plea. Under a nolo plea, the defendant does not contest the
charges against him, and although it "authorizes the court for
purposes of the case to treat defendant as though he were
guilty," the defendant does not expressly admit the offense in
court.m Under an Alford plea, the "defendant pleads guilty,
while either maintaining his innocence or not admitting to hav-
ing committed the crime."0 5 In these situations, courts rarely




In State v. Gleason, Myron Gleason was charged with lewd-
ness; he entered a plea of nolo contendere, and the court placed
him on probation, conditioned upon his participation in a
treatment program for sex offenders. When Gleason repeat-
edly refused to discuss the offense for which he was convicted,
his therapist discontinued treatment.0 8 The therapist stated
that additional treatment would not be helpful as long as Glea-
son denied his offenses.2°9 Consequently, the trial court revoked
Gleason's probation.210  Gleason appealed, claiming that his
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination was violated
' State v. Gleason, 576 A.2d 1246, 1249 (Vt. 1990).
"' State ex reL Warren v. Schwarz, 566 N.W.2d 173, 176 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997), aft'd,
579 N.W.2d 698 (Wis. 1998).
"6 After sentencing, an offender who has entered a nolo or Alford plea is treated
much like an offender who pled guilty. He waives claims unrelated to the plea, in-
cluding his right against self-incrimination. See Gleason, 576 A.2d at 1250 (acknowl-
edging that an offender who plead nolo contendere retains his right against self
incrimination prior to sentencing, but holding that the right is extinguished follow-
ing sentencing); see also United States v. Mapco Gas Products, 709 F. Supp. 895 (E.D.
Ark. 1989); People v. Gentapanan, Nos. 84-00074A, 84-00004A, 1986 WL 68907 (D.
Guam App. Div.July 7, 1986); State v. Butler, 900 P.2d 908, 909 (Mont. 1995); Warren,
566 N.W.2d at 176. Courts only allow defendants to enter nolo and Alford pleas once
they are satisfied that the offenders are entering the pleas voluntarily and with knowl-
edge of the claims they waive, and the other pleading choices that they forgo. See
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970); LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 9, at
933-38.






by his probation condition.21 1 Gleason asserted that by virtue of
his nolo plea, he had never admitted the offense for which he
was sentenced, and that it was improper to compel him to do so
in treatment without a grant of immunity.
212
The Vermont Supreme Court held that the probation con-
dition did not violate Gleason's Fifth Amendment right.2 18  It
stated that a nolo plea waives the defendant's right against self-
incrimination for the offense at issue, and authorizes the court
to "treat the defendant as though he were guilty."214 The court
conceded that a defendant who has pled nolo contendere may in-
voke his Fifth Amendment right at sentencing to avoid a
harsher sentence.215 Following imposition of a sentence, how-
ever, the right against self-incrimination is extinguished with re-
spect to the crime for which the defendant was convicted, and
"because of the protection against double jeopardy, [the] de-
fendant faces no threat of subsequent prosecution for the of-
fense."2 6 A sex offender who has entered a nolo plea is expected
to admit responsibility for his offense in therapy even though he
avoided the issue of guilt in court.
In State v. Butler21 7 Bruce Butler was charged with sexual as-
sault. Butler initially pled not guilty, but then chose to enter an
Alford plea. 8 Butler indicated before the court the dilemma in-
volved in his decision: "[I]f it goes to a jury trial, I'm going to
end up in prison for something I didn't do. And if I plead
guilty and go to this doctor and don't admit it to him, I still end
.. Id. Specifically, the probation condition was a modified probation condition
which required Gleason to "discuss issues surrounding sexual behavior and offenses"
with his therapist. Id. at 1248.
21I2& at 1249.
"' Id. at 1251. The court concluded that the probation condition did not force
Gleason to choose between making incriminating statements and jeopardizing his
conditional liberty by remaining silent. I& Gleason did not face incrimination be-
cause he only needed to discus offenses for which he had already been convicted, and
he had not testified as to his own innocence, so perjury was not at issue.
21 d- at 1249.
2- Id at 1250.
216 id
27 State v. Butler, 900 P.2d 908, 909 (Mont 1995).
218 I
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up in prison.2 1 9 The court sentenced Butler to ten years in
prison, but suspended the sentence in favor of probation, con-
ditioned upon therapy m In the face of damning evidence, the
Alford plea allowed Butler to enter a guilty plea for more lenient
sentencing, while allowing him to maintain that he did not
commit the crime. When Butler refused to admit his offense in
therapy, and violated other probation conditions, the court re-
voked his probation and ordered him to serve the ten year
prison sentence for sexual assault.22'
The Montana Supreme Court acknowledged that Butler en-
tered the Alford plea to obtain favorable sentencing, but stated
that he waived his right against compulsory self-incrimination by
doing so.2 Butler entered his plea knowing that sex offender
treatment was not a condition of probation that the State would
forgo.2 He voluntarily placed himself in a position to be sen-
tenced to treatment that required an admission of guilt.
224
Thus, the court held that the treatment requirement did not
violate Butler's right against self-incrimination, and that the trial
court was justified in revoking his probation.2 "
V. ANALYSIS
This analysis proposes sentencing for convicted sex offend-
ers that maximizes the interests protected by the Fifth Amend-
226ment right against self-incrimination, while preserving the
state's interests in rehabilitating its offenders and protecting its
citizens. First, while Imlay holds that the state may only compel
an admission under a grant of immunity,227 it does not ade-
quately protect against the penalty situation because even an
immunized offender who testified in his own defense at trial
"' Id. at 910-11.
21Id. at 909.
"' Id. at 909-10. The court sentenced Butler to ten years in prison without parole
eligibility until he finished a treatment program. Id- at 910.
SId. at 911.
" Id.
's Id at 912.
2 See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
22 State v. Imlay, 813 P.2d 979, 985 (Mont. 1991).
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risks incriminating himself for perjury. Courts should provide
immunity and prohibit a penalty-probation revocation-for
refusing to admit guilt in order to remove this risk. Second,
combining a limit on the state's power to penalize a convicted
offender who declines to admit guilt with a grant of immunity
opens the possibility that therapists may release patients without
exposing them to penalty, and then refer them temporarily to
alternative treatment programs that either: (1) accept offenders
in denial and pursue less coercive strategies to encourage re-
sponsibility and rehabilitation, or (2) treat offenders who con-
tinue to assert their innocence throughout therapy. Lastly,
although offenders extinguish their privilege against self-
incrimination by entering nolo contendere or Alford pleas at trial,
courts ought to reconsider the sentences given to such offend-
ers. When courts sentence these offenders to therapy programs
in which they must admit responsibility for their crime, the
courts set the offenders up to fail to meet the requirements of
therapy. The offenders have not admitted committing a crime
to the court, and demanding without exception that they take a
contrary position with a therapist in order to participate in
treatment will lead to fewer offenders receiving treatment.
The interests at stake in the adjudication of sex offenders
are naturally opposed to each other. On one hand, the Fifth
Amendment protects the offender's interest in dignity, auton-
omy, and privacy.228 Honoring these interests limits the circum-
stances under which the state may demand that the offender
admit his guilt. If the offender fears that an admission would
risk further incrimination he may maintain his silence, and un-
less the state can immunize him, it may not compel incriminat-
ing statements.l On the other hand, the state has strong dual
interests in rehabilitating the offender and protecting its citi-
zens.23 0 In the case of sex offenders, though, rehabilitation is of-
ten synonymous with an admission of guilt.2' Adding to the
tension between the interests at stake, sex offenders are particu-
Herman, Part i, supra note 25, at 182-86.
Imlay, 813 P.2d at 985.
20 State ex reL Warren v. Schwarz, 566 N.W.2d 173, 177 (Wis. 1997).
"' See Winn, supra note 14, at 26-27.
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larly disposed to deny their offense and their problem gener-
ally. "2 How then, can courts respect the rights of offenders to
refuse to incriminate themselves, and simultaneously demand
that therapists rehabilitate offenders by helping them to admit
responsibility for their crimes? The problem is complicated
when limited therapist-patient confidentiality for sex-offenders
(particularly when the victims are children) is added to the
mix."' The admissions that offenders make to their therapists
may be reported to probation officers, and the police in many
states,2m so the offender who testified on his own behalf at trial
risks prosecution for perjury if he ultimately admits committing
the crime for which he was sentenced. Refusal to admit respon-
sibility is simultaneously a protected right and symptom of a
dangerous condition; admission, while a sign of rehabilitation,
may impermissibly lead the offender to be an accomplice to his
own conviction, or to give a confession of questionable validity.
A. THE NEED FOR IMMUNITY AND PROTECTION FROM PROBATION
REVOCATION FOR CONVICTED OFFENDERS WHO PLEAD NOT
GUILTY
In Imlay, the Montana Supreme Court honored the Fram-
ers' conviction that the power of government is held subordi-
nate to the rights of individuals.2 The founders, wishing to
avoid the inquisitorial procedures of the old English ecclesiasti-
cal courts, sought to protect the right to avoid self-incrimination
under the coercion of the state. 6 The elements of the modern
application of the Fifth Amendment reflect this objective. In
order for the right against self-incrimination to protect an indi-
vidual, he must be subject to compulsion, and he must have an
actual fear of self-incrimination. 7 Thus, Imlay rightly recog-
nized that an offender who pled not guilty and testified on his
"2 Solkoff, supra note 102, at 1451.
SeeLevine & Doherty, supra note 115, at 100.
"* See State v. Fuller, 915 P.2d 809, 811 (Mont. 1996) (noting that therapist was
under statutory duty to report additional sex offenses to the Department of Probation
and Parole).
"' See LEw, supra note 22, at 430.
"' See id. at 405, 430; Herman, Part I, supra note 25, at 163.




own behalf at trial and later refused to admit responsibility for
an offense in therapy under threat of imprisonment satisfied
both requirements.m Compulsion is presumed in such a cir-
cumstance because it is a classic penalty situation, so the right is
self-executing. If Donald Imlay had been required to admit
criminal responsibility under these circumstances, his interest in
protecting himself from state intrusion would have been se-
verely frustrated. Placed in a no-win situation, facing the pen-
alty of imprisonment for maintaining his innocence, or the risk
of incrimination for acquiescing to the demands of treatment,
Imlay's autonomy and his control over his inner thoughts were
compromised. With the threat of punishment lurking for both
silence and admission, Imlay's situation is analogous to that of
John Udall centuries earlier.29 The Montana Supreme Court,
however, refused to penalize Imlay for his silence. Imlay, the
court said, could not be compelled to admit responsibility for
his crime or any past offenses absent a grant of immunity.
24°
Though immunity removes the threat of incrimination for
additional sex offenses, when the client-therapist relationship is
not privileged, it cannot fully assure an offender that he should
feel safe accepting responsibility for a crime. A grant of immu-
nity does not protect against prosecution for perjury, because of
the inherent value and necessity of truthful testimony.241 So,
though the Imlay court properly held that under the presented
circumstances the offender could not be penalized for main-
taining his silence, it failed to recognize that a grant of immu-
nity alone does not remove the offender from a risk of self-
m But see Berg, supra note 74, at 733 (arguing that Imlay incorrectly balanced the
offender's rights over the state's interests in rehabilitating the offenders and protect-
ing its citizens).
2' See LEvY, supra note 22, at 164, 168; Herman, Part I, supra note 25, at 120-21.
While Udall was at trial without knowledge of his accuser or the evidence against him,
and Imlay had already been sentenced after a trial in which he had representation
and knew the accuser and the evidence against him, both men faced a penalty situa-
tion. Furthermore, in each case, though an admission would have been incriminat-
ing, the government extolled its rehabilitative values. See Nelson, supra note 34, at
979.
240 State v. Imlay, 813 P.2d 979, 985 (Mont. 1991).
"4, See Glickstein v. United States, 222 U.S. 139, 141 (1911); see also United States v.
Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 126 (1980).
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incrimination and a classic penalty situation. Immunity would
be of limited benefit if an offender who testified on his own be-
half can still be compelled to admit responsibility, under threat
of probation revocation and imprisonment. Even if the State
had granted Imlay immunity, an admission of guilt would sub-
ject him to possible prosecution for perjury. 42 Further, even if
Imlay's conversations with his therapist were privileged, comple-
tion of a course of treatment that is openly conditioned upon
an admission of guilt would give rise to knowledge that Imlay
had lied under oath at trial. Without divulging the specifics of
privileged conversations between them, the therapist need only
testify that Imlay completed therapy, for the state to have
grounds for a perjury charge.243 In order to effectively remove
the offender from the classic penalty situation, the State must
grant immunity from future prosecution, and forbid probation
revocation and imprisonment if the offender still insists on
maintaining his innocence.
B. FACILITATING REHABILITATION
If courts grant convicted sex offenders immunity from fu-
ture prosecution and prohibit a penalty for refusing to admit re-
sponsibility to a crime in therapy, the courts will preserve
offenders' Fifth Amendment rights and facilitate their rehabili-
tation. Preserving the offender's rights under the Fifth
Amendment and promoting rehabilitation requires the coop-
eration of the courts and therapists who treat sex offenders. 44
2' A prosecution for perjury may not be likely, or even an efficient use of prosecu-
torial resources. However, this does not affect the application of the right against self-
incrimination. In order for the right to apply, the offender need only reasonably fear
incrimination, not prosecution. See Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486
(1951); Berg, supra note 74, at 706 (citing Minor v. United States, 396 U.S. 87, 93
(1969)).
' Berg, supra note 74, at 719.
'"This analysis requires that courts become involved in prescribing a certain mode
of therapy to some classes of sex offenders. To some extent courts are currently in-
volved; they recognize that they are sentencing an offender to a program in which he
will have to admit his guilt. I argue that when an offender's Fifth Amendment rights
are at risk, the court must mandate therapy that facilitates rehabilitation without vio-
lating his right against self-incrimination. Courts are uniquely situated so that they
may protect offenders' fundamental legal rights, while also prescribing therapy best
suited to rehabilitate certain offenders. Therapeutic jurisprudence, the study of law
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Once the threat of probation revocation is removed from the
offender who persists in his denial, the therapist need not in-
form the probation officer that the offender has refused to ad-
mit the offense of which he was convicted. This information will
have no legal implications. At this point, however, instead of
discharging the offender as unamenable to treatment, the
therapist ought to pursue alternative methods of treatment that
either (1) work to break through denial in a motivational rather
than confrontational style, or (2) offer therapy for sex offenders
without focusing on the offender's ownership of a crime.2  Es-
sentially, the therapist ought provide alternatives to termination
from treatment for those offenders who cannot overcome de-
nial. Offenders who refuse to admit responsibility yet remain
invested in their treatment present less of a danger to the com-
munity than either offenders who admit their offense yet do not
finish treatment, or offenders who are rejected from treatment
for maintaining denial.246
The importance of therapists continuing to treat offenders
who are in denial cannot be emphasized enough. It removes
the possibility that an officer of the court could presume that an
offender who completed treatment admitted responsibility for
the offense of which he was convicted. For offenders who testi-
as a therapeutic agent, offers an example of how law can "profit from some of the in-
sights that behavioral sciences provide." David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and
the Ciminal Courts, 35 WM. & MARYL. REV. 279, 280 (1993). Combining knowledge of
law with behavioral science may lead legal actors such as judges and prosecutors to re-
examine their rules arid procedures to forge a more therapeutic criminal justice sys-
tem. IR at 280, 284-85.
211 See Borduin et al., supra note 156; Kear-Colwell, supra note 17, at 261; Marshall
& Barbaree, supra note 103; Schlank & Shaw, supra note 17; Winn, supra note 14, at
26. There is evidence that these therapy programs can be effective in reducing re-
cidivism among those offenders who refuse to admit responsibility, and in eliciting an
admission of responsibility through a motivational, not confrontational approach to
therapy. Borduin's multisystemic therapy, which does not focus explicitly on the of-
fender's admission of responsibility, reduced recidivism rates to 12.5% for sexual of-
fenses. Borduin et al., supra note 156, at 110. This is a significant improvement over
a 60% recidivism rate for untreated offenders. McGrath, supra note 103, at 329.
Schlank and Shaw administered their therapy to ten offenders who had been denied
acceptance to other treatment programs because they refused to accept responsibility
for their offense. Schlank & Shaw, supra note 17, at 19. Of the ten, five responded to
motivational treatment and admitted their offenses. Id. at 21.
"4 Winn, supra note 14, at 26.
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fled on their own behalf at trial, this removes the threat of a per-
jury prosecution, and may help motivate them to challenge
their own denial. Though offenders would no longer be re-
quired to admit responsibility for the offense underlying their
conviction, and they may receive effective treatment in the ab-
sence of an admission, therapy is more effective when offenders
do admit responsibility.2 47
A therapist who normally would refuse to treat an offender
in denial could refer the offender to a treatment program such
as those proposed by Winn,248 Schlank and Shaw,249 or Kear-
Colwell,20 which deviate from the traditional confrontational
mode of approaching denial. These alternative treatment pro-
grams, while facilitating admission of responsibility in offenders
who previously had obstinately maintained their denial, also
may serve the values protected by the Fifth Amendment better
than traditional treatment. For example, a course of treatment
proposed by therapist Mack Winn requires that the treatment
therapist gain the offender's compliance prior to asking the of-
fender to examine his denial.2 ' Thus, this procedure preserves
the offender's sense of autonomy better than confrontational
treatment in which the therapist imposes control and change
from the outside. 2 A client whose claim of innocence is con-
tinually challenged by an individual therapist or a group of
other clients faces an inhospitable situation. An authority that
refuses to accept denial until an admission is forthcoming strips
the individual of control over information about himself and
poses a threat to his dignity.23 Such a requirement recalls the
distaste for old English ecclesiastical courts that exercised con-
siderable coercive pressures upon defendants to admit their
crime even after repeated denials. 4 Though the early courts
24 SeeWinn, supra note 14.
'99 See Schlank & Shaw, supra note 17.
m See Kear-Colwell, supra note 17.
2' Winn, supra note 14, at 31.
2, Kear-Colwell, supra note 17, at 261.
2's See LEW, supra note 22, at 164-68.
24 Id. Of course, the ecclesiastical courts compelled admissions of guilt from de-
fendants in order to secure their convictions, while admissions compelled in therapy
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used physical as well as verbal coercion, the dignity of the indi-
vidual offender is compromised by any compulsion to admit
guilt even if just by a credible verbal threat to imprison for
maintaining silence. Furthermore, the compulsion present in
this circumstance highlights the rationale for "our distrust of
self-deprecatory statements. ' ,ss An offender who expressly re-
fused to admit guilt in court, but then accepted responsibility
for an offense when placed in a penalty situation, may have
made a false confession under the pressure of having to choose
between two undesirable options.
For those offenders who persist in denial even after referral
to a "motivational" treatment, therapists have the option of be-
havioral or cognitive treatment that does not require the of-
fender to focus on ownership of the offense of which he was
convicted. For example, Borduin et al.'s multisystemic ap-
proach to treating sex offenders focuses on changing the multi-
ple environments in which offenders move.s By involving the
other people from these settings, the therapist can work with
them to create supportive environments that are less likely to
engender anti-social behavior while teaching the offender cog-
nitive techniques for keeping his deviant impulses under con-
trol.
257
This treatment scheme allows those who are able to over-
come denial with alternative treatments to do so and then re-
sume treatment in traditional treatment programs that have
been trusted to rehabilitate offenders and reduce recidivism. 
s
Moreover, this scheme allows offenders who continue to believe
in their own innocence, even after motivational treatment
aimed at ameliorating denial, to do so without punishment
come from offenders who have already been convicted. However, in each case, there
is a substantial risk that coercion will beget an unreliable confession. See Peter
Brooks, Storytelling Without Fear? Confession in Law and Literature, 8 YA.uJ.L. & HUMAN.
1, 17 (1996). Brooks notes that "there is something inherently unstable and unreli-
able about the speech act of confession." Id. One may confess to the wrong crime if
he is unsure what is asked of him or if he feels compelled to give the questioners
some response. Id.
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964).
26 See Borduin et al., supra note 156, at 106.
27 See id. at 106, 111.
' See Schlank & Shaw, supra note 17, at 22.
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while continuing to receive therapy aimed at reducing recidi-
vism. The offender is protected from probation revocation and
perjury, and the state interest in rehabilitation is served.
C. REHABILITATION FOR OFFENDERS WHO ENTER NOLO AND
ALFORD PLEAS
The Fifth Amendment does not mandate that courts offer
immunity or protection from probation revocation for offend-
.ers who entered nolo or Alford pleas; these offenders consent to
have their right against self-incrimination extinguished follow-
ing sentencing2 9 Moreover, such offenders do not need alter-
native treatment programs that do not require admission of
guilt for entrance or completion to save them from the pre-
sumption of perjury that accrues to offenders who testify in
their own defense yet fail to complete treatment. These offend-
ers face no prospect of incrimination, and thus no penalty situa-
tion. Though not constitutionally required, treatment
programs for sex offenders such as the one detailed by Borduin
would provide offenders who had entered nolo or Alford pleas
with a better chance at rehabilitation than programs which re-
quire an admission for entrance. When courts sentence offend-
ers who enter nolo or Alford pleas like those in Gleason and Butler
to conventional therapy programs in which they are required to
admit guilt as a condition of entrance into the program, the
courts set them up to fail. A defendant may choose to enter a
nolo plea precisely because it allows him to deny the facts of the
charge in a future proceeding.2' A defendant chooses to enter
an Alford plea precisely because he insists on continuing to
maintain his innocence.2 6' How can courts expect that such de-
fendants will be inclined to make an explicit admission of guilt
that is required for entrance into a sex offender therapy pro-
gram? These convicted offenders will be denied admission into
conventional therapy programs, leaving them untreated and
more dangerous than if they had been meaningfully involved in
' See State v. Gleason, 576 A.2d 1246, 1269 (Vt. 1990); State v. Butler, 900 P.2d
908, 911 (Mont. 1995); discussion supra Part IV.B.
See Gleason, 576 A.2d at 1250.
' See Butler, 900 P.2d at 911.
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cognitive or behavioral therapies that do not require an admis-
sion of guilt.26 If courts are going to continue to allow sex of-
fenders to enter nolo and Alford pleas, they ought to sentence
them to the alternative treatment programs that continue to of-
fer rehabilitative therapy to offenders who deny responsibility
for an offense.6 While this is not constitutionally required be-
cause these offenders have waived their Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination, alternative therapies that keep the of-
fender's locus of control within himself and avoid repeated de-
mands for a confession will better serve the values of dignity and
autonomy that underlie the Fifth Amendment. This course of
action will also allow more convicted sex offenders to receive
treatment and reduce the likelihood of recidivism.2 4
VI. CONCLUSION
The Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination pro-
vides us with some of our most treasured protections-preserva-
tion of our autonomy, privacy, and dignity against the threat of
state coercion. Court-ordered therapy programs that require
convicted sex offenders to admit responsibility for the offense of
which they were convicted under threat of probation revocation
and imprisonment violate these protections. Sentences and ap-
proaches to treatment can be modified, though, to preserve the
interests protected by the Fifth Amendment while also satisfying
the state interest in rehabilitating offenders. Courts and thera-
pists may promote these interests by: (1) insulating offenders in
therapy who testified in their own defense at trial with immunity
and a protection against penalizing a refusal to admit guilt, and
' 2SeeWinn, supra note 14, at 26.
2' As long as offenders are given an opportunity to receive therapy in which they
are not compelled to admit their offense, nolo and Alford pleas should be allowed for
sex offenders. Some have raised the possibility that these pleas should not be avail-
able to sex offenders because of the conflict that arises between offenders' refusal to
admit guilt in court, and the common requirement that they do so as a condition of
their sentence. See Hinshaw, supra note 10, at 282, 297. However, to eliminate these
pleas would eliminate substantial benefits. Both the nolo and Alford pleas spare the
courts additional costly and lengthy trials, and offer the defendant some security that
his sentence will be predictable. See LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 9, at 932; Hinshaw,
supra note 10, at 281.
264 SeeWinn, supra note 14, at 26.
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(2) utilizing alternative treatment methods that are less con-
frontational and less concerned with an initial acceptance of re-
sponsibility.
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